Unlike the nations of Central and Eastern Europe which retained their nominal sovereignty, the Baltic states were annexed into the Soviet Union, following up on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its secret protocols. Under Mr. Gorbachev the Soviet leadership seemed to be ready not to apply force to prevent the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany, in return for major disarmament agreements and the „peace dividend“ involved. But when it came to the break-up of the Soviet Union itself – there Mr. Gorbachev set the limit. And when it became evident that his halfhearted attempts at reform inside the Soviet Union had failed , he had only one major aim left for staying in power: to keep the Soviet Union together – under a new constitution – at all cost. Failing that, he would lose his grip on power.
DANISH POLICY TOWARDS THE BALTIC STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1988-1991: TO BE OR NOT TO BE? – THAT IS THE QUESTION
The editors of BALTIC STUDIES – a periodical on international affairs and politics – asked me to review an article by a Danish scholar on the policy of the Danish government (and major parties) on the Baltic nations´ struggle for their restored independence. My review was published on the Magazine´s web side. – JBH
This article is not so much about Danish support for the Baltic struggle for independence; rather it is about domestic politics – electoral maneuvers between the major parties on how they could be seen to express „small state sympathy“, without risking the wrath of the Soviet Union or the displeasure of powerful allies. It is therefore of interest, mainly for those who want to know what happened behind the scenes in Danish politics. For those who want to understand the risks and potential dangers for the Baltic nations of seceeding from the Soviet Union, it is hardly of any interest.
